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ABTRACT
Upcoding is one of important indicators of moral hazard and fraud in Social 
Health Insurance scheme. However, there seems to be little evidence about 
incidence of upcoding and how upcoding occurs in hospital, especially in 
rural province hospital. The objective of this study is to determine incidence 
and root cause of upcoding in the implementation of Social Health Insurance 
in Rural Province Hospital in Indonesia. The data used in this study were 
both qualitative and quantitative data (mixed method). Three hundred and 
sixty (360) inpatient medical records from six rural province hospitals 
were examined in this study. Diagnosis and procedure codes recorded in 
these medical records were re-coded by an independent senior coder (ISC). 
Codes from hospitals’ coders and codes from ISC were then re-grouped 
using INA-CBG casemix grouper to determine the casemix groups and 
the hospital tariffs. If the hospital tariff obtained by hospital coder is higher 
than that obtained by ISC, it is considered as upcoding. This qualitative 
study was conducted using Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and in-depth 
interviews in hospitals located in a rural province of Indonesia. In depth 
interview was held for two hospital directors and two officers from the 
Social Security Administrator (Indonesia: Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan 
Sosial / BPJS), an agent that manages the Statutory Health Insurance 
(SHI). Six clinicians and six coders attended the FGD. We asked open-
ended questions about their perceptions on upcoding in hospitals. The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were 
then thematically analyzed. Upcoding cases were found in 11.9% (43/360) 
medical records. Upcoding cases were dominated by Deliveries Group 
2.8% (10/360) and Female reproductive system Groups 1.7% (6/360). 
The potential loss of income due to upcoding was IDR 154.626.000 or 
9% of hospital revenue. Appointment of non-medical doctors as internal 
verifiers, lack of clear coding guidelines, lack of training for doctors and 
coders, and poor coordination between hospital and BPJS to resolve coding 
disagreement were root causes of upcoding in hospital. Policies to prevent 
and manage upcoding should be urgently developed and implemented in 
the Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) program in Indonesia especially to 
prepare upcoding guidelines, enhance medical coding training regularly, 
increase number of coders and verification staff from medical background, 
and strengthen coordination for coding problem solving in hospital.
Keywords: Hospital, Upcoding, Root Cause
1. INTRODUCTION
The National Health Insurance (NHI), or 
Statutory Health Insurance (SHI), which 
has been implemented since 2014 aims 
to ensure that participants benefit from 
health care and protection in meeting 
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basic health needs. Indonesia has com-
mitted that, in the five years since its 
implementation precisely on January 1, 
2019, the entire population of Indonesia 
will have participated in the National 
Health Insurance (NHI) so that universal 
coverage is achieved. (Ministry of Health, 
2004)
Various obstacles faced by BPJS Health 
and the government in the implementation 
of National Health Insurance, one of which 
is the mismatch between BPJS Health 
revenues and benefit costs. This causes 
BPJS Health to experience deficits from 
year to year. In 2014 the BPJS Health deficit 
was IDR 3.3 trillion, in 2015 was IDR 5.7 
trillion, and in 2016 was IDR 6.8 trillion 
(BPJS, 2016a). One of the causes of this 
deficit was the possibility of fraud or moral 
hazard that occurred at National Health 
Insurance providers, such as hospitals.
The types of fraud that occur in 
hospitals are contained in Minister 
of Health Regulation No. 35 of 2015 
concerning Prevention of Fraud in the 
implementation of the National Health 
Insurance program in the National Health 
Insurance System. One type of fraud 
that can occur in hospitals is upcoding 
(Ministry of Health, 2015a).
Upcoding is changing the diagnosis 
code and / or procedure into a code that has 
a higher tariff than it should be (Ministry 
of Health, 2015b). Upcoding is also defined 
as an act of changing a patient’s Diagnosis-
Related Group (DRG) to another DRG 
which results in higher payments from 
third parties (Barros and Braun, 2016). 
According to Silverman and Skinner, DRG 
upcoding refers to erroneous coding that 
result in the shifting of a patient episode 
into a DRG with a higher reimbursement 
cost (Silverman and Skinner, 2004).
Until now there have been only a 
few studies that discuss the upcoding in 
hospitals in the National Health Insurance 
era. This study aims to determine the 
magnitude of upcoding, hospital losses 
due to upcoding, and the root cause of 
upcoding in hospitals in West Sumatra 
Province.
2. METHODS
This research used mix method by 
combining quantitative and qualitative 
data. Quantitative data were obtained 
from 360 inpatient medical records at 
6 hospitals consisting of 3 government 
hospitals and 3 private hospitals. At each 
hospital 60 medical records were taken, 
and divided into 4 large casemix groups, 
namely surgical inpatient cases (group 1), 
non-procedure inpatient cases (group 4), 
obstetric inpatient cases (group 6), and 
neonatal inpatient cases (group 8).
This quantitative study used an 
independent senior coder (ISC) as a 
reviewer of the patient’s medical record. 
Upcoding is detected by comparing 
diagnosis codes and procedures written 
by hospital coders with codes written by 
independent senior coders (ISC). These 
two codes were re-entered in the INA CBG 
software to see the INA CBG rates. If the 
INA CBG tariff is higher than the code 
generated by the hospital code, the medical 
record file is classified as up coding. Data 
analysis was carried out univariately 
and looked at the losses incurred due to 
upcoding.
This qualitative research used in-depth 
interview methods and Focus Group 
Discussion. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with two hospital directors, 
and two BPJS Health verifiers. FGDs 
were conducted on six specialist doctors 
and six hospital coders. The results of the 
study were analyzed in stages starting 
from processing the themes, categorizing, 
finding key relationships, and making 
maps or matrices.
3. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1. Upcoding Frequency Distribution
Variable Up Coding 43 11,9 %
No Up Coding 317 88,1 %
Total 360 100 %
Source: Primary Data
From Table 1, it can be seen that 
upcoding was found in 43/360 medical 
records or 11.9%.
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Table 2 shows that the largest 
percentage of upcoding incidents was in 
CMG O, namely Deliveries Group (2.8%), 
followed by CMG W, namely Female 
Reproductive System Groups (1.7%).
The results of the calculation of 
hospital losses due to upcoding are 9% of 
total hospital revenue.
The results of qualitative research state 
that the causes of upcoding can be classified 
in three causes: 1) related to hospitals; 2) 
related to doctors; and 3) related to coders. 
The cause of upcoding from the hospital 
side is that until now there has been no 
clear coding guidelines. The Ministry 
of Health has issued Minister of Health 
Regulation No. 76 of 2016 concerning the 
guidelines of the Indonesian Case-Based 
Groups (INA CBG) in the Implementation 
of National Health Insurance (Kemenkes 
RI, 2016b), but there is also a circular 
letter from the Minister of Health No. 
HK.03.03 / Menkes / 518/2016 concerning 
Guidelines for Resolving Problems of INA 
CBG Claims in organizing National Health 
Insurance, and Cover Letter of Minutes 
of Agreement with the Guidelines for 
the Implementation of Solution for INA 
CBG Claim Problems from BPJS Health. 
According to the informant, there are some 
changes in the new rules compared to the 
previous rules. For example, initially a 
urinary tract infection (UTI) disease may 
be coded as a diagnosis, but after there is a 
new regulation the UTI that can be coded is 
a UTI caused by stones in the urinary tract. 
Likewise with anemia, initally anemia may 
be coded as a diagnosis, but in the new 
rule anemia can only be coded if blood 
transfusion is needed. These changes make 
ambiguous boundaries about upcoding. 
Hospitals may unintentionally conduct 
upcoding due to ignorance of the new 
rules.
Another thing found in this study 
was that hospitals might argue differently 
from BPJS Health verifiers. In some cases, 
according to the informant, there were 
Table 2. Percentage of Upcoding based on Casemix Main Group
Variable Casemix 
Main Group Total %
Explanation 
Upcoding  
(43)
O 10 2,8 Deliveries Group
W 6 1,7 Female reproductive system Groups
P 4 1,1 Newborns & Neonates Groups
K 4 1,1 Digestive system Group
G 3 0,8 Central nervous system Groups
I 3 0,8 Cardiovascular system Groups
L 3 0,8 Skin, subcutaneous tissue & breast Group
M 3 0,8 Musculoskeletal system & connective tissue Groups
D 2 0,5 Haemopoeitic & immune system Groups
C 1 0,3 Myeloproliferative system & neoplasms Groups
E 1 0,3 Endocrine system, nutrition & metabolism Groups
J 1 0,3 Respiratory system Groups
N 1 0,3 Nephro-urinary System Groups
U 1 0,3 Ear, nose, mouth & throat Groups
Source: Primary Data
Table 3. Losses due to Upcoding
(a) Total Hospital Revenue 
from the Total Sample (IDR)
(b) Losses due to Up 
coding Cases
Percentage of Loss due to Up coding 
cases (%) (b/c)x100%
1.721.453.800,00 154.626.000,00 9%
Source: Primary Data
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files that were suspended by the Health 
BPJS because according to the verifier 
the diagnosis or procedure could not be 
claimed. The hospital actually had the 
right to answer this matter. There were 
several teams that could be consulted for 
coding disagreements between hospitals 
and BPJS Health, such as the coding 
consideration team, clinical consideration 
team, anti-fraud team from the District / 
City and Provincial Health Offices, and the 
Cost Control and Quality Control Team. 
But in practice the decision of the coding 
consideration team, for example, did not 
have permanent legal force, meaning that 
it was not absolutely a decision of the 
difference in understanding. This study 
also found that the hospital did not know 
the flow of coordination between the teams 
formed to resolve the problem of coding 
disagreement between the hospital and 
BPJS Health. The intended coordination 
flow was about which team that had the 
first role to solve the coding problem, and 
the next flow.
Another factor of upcoding is 
the doctor factor. According to the 
informant, doctors often did not know 
the coding rules. In the doctor’s opinion, 
the symptoms of the disease could also 
be included in medical coding, when in 
fact it could not. In addition, the coders 
sometimes had difficulty reading unclear 
doctor’s handwriting and abbreviations 
that were not understood. This could 
actually be bridged by the presence of 
general practitioners as internal verifiers 
of hospitals. However, in reality, not all 
hospitals had general practitioners as 
internal verifiers. In hospitals that did 
not have general practitioners as internal 
verifiers, the coder claimed to have often 
experienced miscommunication with 
specialist doctors.
Another cause of upcoding from 
the coder side was the lack of coder 
knowledge on the latest Ministry of Health 
regulations on medical coding. The coders 
who often participated in training felt a 
better understanding than just reading the 
Minister of Health regulations. However, 
the problem was that not all hospitals 
allowed coders to take part in training 
outside the city. This was also related to 
the low number of coders in the hospital, 
so that if the coders attended training, the 
service would be disrupted. 
DISCUSSION
The upcoding cases in found this study 
were higher than those found in Germany 
and Australia. In Germany, upcoding 
occurred in 1% of inpatient payments 
(Lungen and Lauterbach, 2000), whereas 
in Australia, coding audits conducted in 
1995-1996 showed that medical records 
containing upcoding were 5.2% while 
downcoding were 6.5% (Victoria State 
Government, 1997).
According to Steinbusch et al (2007), 
who examined casemix systems in USA, 
Australia and the Netherlands, upcoding 
was influenced by: 1) market characteristics 
(profit-making hospitals, hospital size, 
and financial situation), 2) characteristics 
of control systems (internal and external 
control mechanisms), 3) characteristics of 
casemix system (ambiguous classification 
criteria, time of first registration, coder 
incentives, and possibility to change the 
code after first registration (Steinbusch et 
al., 2007).
Upcoding itself can be categorized 
into three criteria. First, the coders explore 
the discharge summary and retrieve the 
best code. This new code can be obtained 
by exchanging primary and secondary 
diagnoses. (Steinbusch et al., 2007, 
Serdén et al., 2003). This can be done 
with computer software (Korcok, 1984). 
Hospitals can claim that the code change 
is in anticipation of under-reimbursement 
of the doctor’s non-specificity in writing 
disease narratives. (Hsia et al., 1992). This 
type of code manipulation can only be 
done if the process of coding the disease 
is done after the patient goes home, such 
as the casemix system in the United States 
and Australia. Second, hospital coders 
can skip discharge summary and look for 
conditions that can be reimbursed in the 
patient’s medical record. This is known as 
60| Syafrawati et al., Incidence and Root Cause of Upcoding
the DRG Bracket Creep, which is known 
as “benign” in upcoding (Silverman and 
Skinner, 2004). The most extreme form of 
upcoding is a in the form of manipulation 
by exaggerating the code without any 
supporting evidence in the medical record. 
The patient’s condition can be made more 
severe by adding a secondary diagnosis 
(Serdén et al., 2003).
The results showed that the upcoding 
incidents that occurred in the hospitals 
in West Sumatra province were more 
common due to accidental factors, such as 
system weaknesses and human error. The 
absence of definite coding guidelines, the 
absence of internal verifier of a doctor in 
hospital, the unclear coordination flow of 
the team in charge of solving the coding 
problem between the hospital and BPJS 
Health, the lack of knowledge of doctors 
and coders about the latest coding rules, 
and the minimal number of coders in the 
hospital were the root causes of upcoding 
incidents.
Therefore, the approach in preventing 
upcoding, which is categorized as fraud in 
Minister of Health Regulation (PMK) No. 
36 of 2015, using pattern of punishment is 
not appropriate. It would be better if the 
root of the upcoding problem is solved 
first so that the hospital can do the medical 
coding correctly and accurately.
4. CONCLUSION
More than one tenth of the medical 
record contains upcoding. The root of the 
upcoding problem is due to the absence of 
definite upcoding guidelines, ignorance 
of coders and doctors, and the minimal 
number of internal verifiers of doctors and 
coders in hospitals.
It is recommended that the Ministry 
of Health issue clear coding and upcoding 
rules. In addition, it is also recommended 
that hospitals conduct coding training on 
doctors and coders routinely, increase the 
number of internal doctors verifiers, and 
increase the number of coders.
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